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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Could the trial court even rule on the issues 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel without having 
before it at least copies of the Orders (or supposed orders) 
that it relied upon to make its ruling? 
2. Did the trial court properly apply the 
principle of res judicata? 
3. If not, are plaintiff's claims barred by 
collateral estoppel arising out of a decision adverse to 
plaintiff in a prior action against a different part? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant (Trimble) is a real estate 
broker. Defendants-respondents (Monte Vista) owned a large 
ranch. The ranch was sold to one Fitzgerald. In graphic 
terms the parties are as follows: 
Monte Vista Fitzgerald 
(Seller)^ (Buyer) 
Trimble^ 
(Broker) 
In an earlier trial, Trimble (broker) sued 
Fitzgerald (buyer) for a real estate commission. The jury 
ruled against Trimble (broker), and this Court affirmed 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 
(Utah 1981) . 
In the same prior action, Fitzgerald (buyer) filed 
a third-party complaint against Monte Vista's former share-
holders. That third-party action, which alleged that the 
former shareholders would have to indemnify the buyer (Fitz-
gerald) for any judgment which plaintiff might obtain 
against him, was dismissed by the Court as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff did not join in that third-party complaint. 
After losing the first trial, Trimble (broker) 
brought this second lawsuit. In this second lawsuit, 
Trimble (broker) sued the seller (Monte Vista) for a real 
estate commission. In other words, the first lawsuit was by 
the broker against the buyer. This second lawsuit is by the 
broker against the seller. 
In this action, Monte Vista moved for summary 
judgment. The Fourth District Court granted the motion rul-
ing that plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. 
FACTS 
The Parties. Plaintiff-appellant is a real estate 
broker who had a listing agreement to sell ranch property 
("the Ranch") located in Cedar Valley, Utah and owned by 
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defendant Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. ("Monte Vista, [R 1-4, 
153]). Defendants Wallace Ohran, Ray Nelson, Howard 
Sherwood, Joyce Rice, and Neldon Williams (hereinafter 
"Monte Vista's" former shareholders) were the stockholders 
of Monte Vista (R. 182-195) before they sold their stock to 
the buyer plaintiff found. Wallace Ohren was Monte Vista's 
president. (R. 2.) 
Leland Fitzgerald, who is not a party to this 
action but who was the purchaser in the sale which is the 
subject of this action , was the defendant in a prior 
action brought by plaintiff for his commission. 
The Sale of the Ranch. Sometime before December 
1977, Ohran engaged plaintiff to sell the Ranch and orally 
agreed to pay plaintiff a six percent (6%) commission. 
After working on the sale for several years, plaintiff found 
a buyer, Leland Fitzgerald. (R. 2, 153-159.) Protracted 
negotiations followed. Eventually, Monte Vista offered to 
sell the Ranch to Fitzgerald for $2,000,000 and to pay 
plaintiff's commission. (R. 153-154.) Monte Vista then 
agreed to reduce the price to $1,875,000 on the condition 
that Fitzgerald would pay plaintiff's commission. (R. 
153-154). Fitzgerald accepted. 
Monte Vista and Fitzgerald memorialized their 
agreement in an Earnest Money Agreement dated December 7, 
1977. (R. 19, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A".) 
Among other things, the Earnest Money stated that Buyer 
(Fitzgerald) was "to be responsible for all real estate 
commissions". (Id.) Plaintiff was not a party to the 
Earnest Money (Id.), though he was present when it was 
signed. 
The Ranch was Monte Vista's major asset and for 
tax reasons, the parties to the Earnest Money decided to 
transfer ownership of the corporate stock instead of 
transferring title to the property itself. Accordingly, 
Monte Vista's former shareholders entered into a Stock Sale 
Agreement dated May 18, 1978, with Fitzgerald under which 
their stock was sold to Fitzgerald. (R. 182-185, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit lfBlf.) The Stock Sale Agreement 
contained an integration clause which explicitly stated that 
this subsequent agreement "constitutes the entire agreement 
among the parties" and "supersedes all prior agreements." 
(R. 191.) With respect to plaintiff's commissions, the 
parties to the Stock Sale Agreement represented and warrant-
ed to each other that they had "incurred no obligation for 
real estate or other brokerage commissions." (R. 189.) The 
Stock Sale Agreement did not contain the provision found in 
the Earnest Money Agreement which required Fitzgerald to 
take care of any commissions. 
Plaintiff was not a party to the Stock Sale 
Agreement. (R. 182-195.) He was not present at its 
execution. (R. 197-198.) He did not even learn about the 
agreement's existence until long after its execution, and 
did not read a copy of it until August 15, 1984
 if more than 
six (6) years after it had been written. (Id.) 
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The Suit Against Fitzgerald, The December 1977 
Earnest Money Agreement did not specify on its face how much 
plaintiff was to be paid or the terms of payment. (R. 19.) 
Plaintiff negotiated at least some of these items with 
Fitzgerald, but their respective understanding of their 
discussions are unclear, disputed and sharply in conflict. 
(R. 154-155.) In his memorandum in the present case, Judge 
Sam observed that "the Utah Supreme Court was unable to 
determine from the record the exact nature of the dealings 
between Florence (the plaintiff's proprietor) and 
Fitzgerald." (R. 253.) Judge Sam felt that "Fitzgerald and 
the plaintiff were still negotiating as to their possible 
joint purchase of the assets of Monte Vista when the Earnest 
Money was signed." (Id.). Indeed, it was Fitzgerald's 
contention in the prior action that he never agreed to pay 
plaintiff a money commission and that he only agreed to 
allow plaintiff to buy part of the Ranch but that plaintiff 
did not keep up his end of the bargain. (Fitzgerald's 
responding brief in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
62 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) (No. 16746), page 2, reproduced in 
relevant part as Exhibit "C".) 
Fitzgerald did pay $5,000 towards plaintiff's 
commissions but refused to pay any more. (R. 1-4.) 
Plaintiff sued Fitzgerald asserting that he was a 
third-party beneficiary of that part of the December 1977 
Earnest Money which specified that Fitzgerald was to take 
care of the real estate commissions. (R. 153-155.) Amid 
all the conflicting testimony concerning what Fitzgerald's 
arrangement with plaintiff was, a jury held that Fitzgerald 
did not owe anything to plaintiff, and the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld their decision. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981). 
Plaintiff did not file any claims against Monte 
Vista itself or against its former shareholders in that 
prior action. (R. 17.) 
One of the defenses asserted by Fitzgerald in the 
prior action was that the Sales Purchase Agreement which was 
executed after the Earnest Money Agreement and which 
explicitly disclaimed any responsibility for paying 
plainitff's commission (R. 187) revoked the obligation to 
pay plaintiff. (See R. 59-61.) In the prior action, the 
Court ruled as a matter of law that this was not the case 
and that Fitzgerald was responsible to plaintiff as a result 
of the Earnest Money Agreement (R. 155). 
Fitzgerald* s Third-Party Complaint. In the prior 
action, Fitzgerald filed a Third-Party Complaint against 
Monte Vista's former shareholders for indemnification of any 
amount which he might have to pay plaintiff (R. 17). Monte 
Vista itself was not made a party of any kind, and plaintiff 
did not assert any kind of claim against it or its former 
shareholders. (Id.). 
In that prior action, the trial court held as a 
matter of law that Monte Vista did not have to indemnify 
Fitzgerald for any judgment which might be entered against 
him and in favor of the plaintiff. (R. 155.) 
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The Present Action, Following the conclusion of 
the litigation against Fitzgerald, plaintiff filed the 
present action against Monte Vista and its former 
shareholders alleging breach of contract and the right to 
recover the balance of his still unpaid commissions under 
quantum meruit. (R. 1-4.) 
The Court wondered why the case could not be 
determined on the basis of res judicata. (R. 95.) When 
defendants briefed the Court on the issue, they highlighted 
a part of a jury instruction quoted in the Supreme Court's 
opinion from a prior case which read as follows: 
. . . The Court has ruled as a matter of 
law that the agreement of December 7, 
1977 imposed upon defendant [Fitzgerald] 
the liability for the real estate 
commission, if any, owed plainitffs upon 
this transaction. (R. 147.) 
Defendants then, without giving the Court copies 
of the actual ruling that the jury instruction refers to, 
asserted that: 
"Thus, the Trial Court in that 
proceeding, had ruled that if any 
commission was owed, it was owed by the 
defendant, Leland Fitzgerald." 
(R. 147.) 
Not realizing that the jury instruction was given in the 
context of a situation where Fitzgerald had contended that 
the December 7, 1977 Earnest Money had been superseded by a 
subsequent Stock Purchase Agreement which relieved him of 
all responsibility to pay plaintiff and in the context of 
Fitzgerald1s Third-Party Complaint for indemnification, (R. 
59-61), the District Court Judge concluded that there was 
some kind of order in the prior case which found "that 
Fitzgerald was solely liable for any real estate 
commissions" (R. 251 [emphasis added]) and granted summary 
judgment against plaintiff on the basis of res judicata and 
collageral estoppel. (R. 251-254.) 
The record in the prior case contains no order 
saying "plainitff could look only to Fitzgerald." The jury 
instruction relied upon says that Fitzgerald was responsible 
to plaintiff under the December 7, 1977 Earnest Money. It 
does not say that Fitzgerald was the "only" one responsible 
or that he was "solely" responsible. (R. 155.) In fact, 
there could have been no determination made on that issue 
because plaintiff did not assert claims against Monte Vista 
and its former shareholders in the prior action. (R. 17.) 
The issue of Monte Vista's liability to plaintiff was not 
litigated in the prior action, and the jury instruction 
language can only refer to the ruling that the trial court 
made on Fitzgerald's assertion that his obligations to 
plaintiff had been eliminated by the subsequent Stock 
Purchase Agreement or to the dismissal of Fitzgerald's 
Third-Party Complaint (see page 19 of Fitzgerald's 
responding brief filed in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 [Ut. 1981] No. 16746 relevant 
pages of which are reproduced as Exhibit " C"; see also, the 
copy of the third-party complaint and the minute entry 
dismissing it attached as Exhibit "D".) 
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The Fourth District Court did not have before it 
the record of the prior case as the prior case was filed in 
Salt Lake rather than Utah County. (R. 17.) There is no 
evidence in the present case's Record showing that the issue 
of whether plaintiff agreed or accepted Fitzgerald's promise 
to be responsible for plaintiff's commission as a release of 
Monte Vista's obligation to him was actually either litiga-
ted or adjudicated. Of course, that issue was not and could 
not have been litigated and decided because Monte Vista and 
its shareholders were not even sued by plaintiff in the 
prior action against Fitzgerald. (R. 17.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For res judicata to apply, both the prior and the 
subsequent actions must involve the same parties or their 
privies and must also involve the same cause of action. For 
collateral estoppel to apply, the precise issue to be pre-
cluded in the second action must be exactly the same as that 
which was fully litigated in the first action. In addition 
to these two (2) requirements, there must be a final judg-
ment on the issue for which preclusion is sought, and the 
party against whom preclusion is sought must have been a 
party or in privity with a party in the prior action. When 
the actual decisions made in the prior case are carefully 
analyzed, it becomes readily apparent that neither the 
doctrine of res judicata nor the related concept of col-
lateral estoppel are applicable. 
The Court's ruling in the present case is based 
upon its conclusion that one of the matters litigated in the 
prior case was these defendants' liability to plaintiff. 
This was not the case, and one of the problems with the 
trial court's decision was that it did not have the record 
of the prior case before it. This precluded it from deter-
mining exactly what was and what was not litigated. 
The admitted fact is that plaintiff did not file 
any claims against the defendants to this action in the 
prior case. Any issues actually involving these present de-
fendants were litigated in the context of a third-party 
complaint filed by Fitzgerald for indemnification in the 
event that plaintiff recovered from Fitzgerald. Those is-
sues involved different documents and different facts than 
what is involved in the present case. Because of this fact 
and because plaintiff was most certainly not in privity with 
Fitzgerald whom he was suing, neither res judicata nor col-
lateral estoppel can apply. 
The only determinations adverse to plaintiff in 
the prior action came on plaintiff's claim against Fitzgerald 
and involved issues which are not relevant to the present 
action. Plaintiff's action against Fitzgerald determined 
that whatever plaintiff's arrangement with Fitzgerald was, 
it fell through or was otherwise such that Fitzgerald no 
longer owed plaintiff anything. The action against Fitz-
gerald did not conclude that plaintiff's commission had been 
fully paid. Nor did it conclude that plaintiff could not 
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look to someone else for the unpaid balance. It simply held 
that under the specific arrangement which plaintiff had with 
Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald was no longer obligated to pay plain-
tiff anything. 
It is hornbook law that a debtor cannot contract 
with a third-party to pay his debts and have the debtor re-
leased from any obligation to his creditor without the 
creditor1s agreement to release the debtor from his respon-
sibility. When a third-party undertakes the responsibility 
to pay another's debt, the creditor may accept the third-
party obligation as additional security or, he may agree 
that the third-party's agreement to pay the debt discharges 
the debtor. But a debtor cannot simply tell a third-party 
to pay a debt and leave the creditor to make whatever deal 
he can with the third-party. 
The crucial issue of whether plaintiff agreed to 
release the defendants to this action from all responsibili-
ty to pay his commission simply was not determined against 
plaintiff in the prior action. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT EXAMINING THE ACTUAL 
RECORD OF THE PRIOR ACTION. 
The prior action which defendants rely on was 
filed in Salt Lake County (R. 17). The present action is a 
Utah County case. The Court did not have the prior record 
before it when it made its determination. 
To be sure, the Court was presented with bits and 
pieces from the prior case. (R. 49-80, Plaintiff's Trial 
Brief; R. 81-87, a short excerpt from the prior trial; andf 
R. 153-155, the Supreme Court opinion in the prior case.) 
However, those pieces are extremely incompletef and they do 
not even mention the issue of whether plaintiff intended to 
release defendants by agreeing to accept payment from Fitz-
gerald. Nor do they mention the third-party complaint filed 
by Fitzgerald. (Id.) 
These omissions are crucial. It was only in con-
junction with the third-party complaint by Fitzgerald 
against Monte Vista's former shareholders that all of the 
decisions in favor of those particular defendants were 
rendered. That third-party action involved completely dif-
ferent issues from plaintiff's underlying claim against 
Fitzgerald, and plaintiff was not a party to that action. 
This unfamiliarity with the underlying action led 
the Trial Court to err. In particular, the Trial Court 
concluded that the previous decision determined as a matter 
of final judgment that Fitzgerald was solely responsible to 
plaintiff for plaintiff's commission. That determination 
could not possibly have been made because those defendants 
were not involved in any claims by plaintiff. (R* 17.) The 
issue of whether plaintiff's looking to Fitzgerald for pay-
ment constituted a novation which released defendants from 
their responsibility was not litigated and could not be 
litigated because plaintiff did not sue defendants in the 
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prior action (R. 17) . The only final judgment in favor of 
defendants in the final action was on Fitzgerald's third-
party claim for indemnification which, as will be discussed 
later, involved different issues. 
The Trial Court relied on a jury instruction given 
in connection with plaintiff's claim against Fitzgerald to 
reach its conclusion. The instruction which the Court used 
as the basis for defendants' summary judgment motion in this 
case reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
"The Court has ruled that as a matter of 
law that the agreement of December 7, 
1977 imposed upon defendant the 
liability for the real estate 
commission, if any, owed plaintiff on 
this transaction." 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 
1981) (See also R. 147.) 
That instruction, however, does not refer to any 
decision stating that these defendant would not be liable to 
plaintiff, for there was no such decision. The reference to 
the ruling as a matter of law can only have reference either 
to the dismissal of Fitzgerald's Third-Party Complaint or to 
the arguments made in the prior case that the Stock Purchase 
Agreement subsequently entered into by Fitzgerald and Monte 
Vista's former shareholders abrogated Fitzgerald's 
responsibility to pay plaintiff's commission as outlined in 
the December 7, 1977 Earnest Money. (See R. 59-61.) (See 
also pages 17-19 of Fitzgerald's Responding Brief in Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981) 
No. 16746, copies of which are attached as Exhibit "C",) 
i -x 
There simply is no reference in the present case to any ac-
tual order of the Trial Court in the prior case stating that 
Fitzgerald was the only one who could be liable to plaintiff. 
There was no such order. 
There is no evidence presented to the Trial Court 
upon which it could base its collateral estoppel and res 
judicata decisions, and Utah law on the subject is clear. 
"The mere fact that there was a record 
of another action on file in the clerk's 
office did not place these records in 
evidence. . . .since the record of a 
prior action was not before the Trial 
Courtr there is no basis to sustain the 
determination that plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata." 
Parish v. Layton City Corporation, 
452 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1975). 
In res judicata and collateral estoppel situations, 
the Court cannot rely upon counsel's memoranda containing 
references to the previous litigation. The necessary docu-
ments must be "examined independently by the Trial Court." 
Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978). 
II. RES JUDICATA IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE. 
For res judicata to apply, both suits must involve 
the same parties or the privies, and both suits must involve 
the same cause of action. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 
(Utah 1982); Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1978) . Neither of these two requirements is satisfied in 
the present case. 
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A* The Two Causes of Action Relied Upon for Res 
Judicata are not the Same. 
The claim against these defendants in the prior 
action was asserted by Fitzgerald, not plaintiff, and was 
for indemnification in the event that plaintiff was able to 
obtain a judgment against Fitzgerald. (R. 17.) Plaintiff's 
present claim is that Monte Vista and its former sharehold-
ers must pay him his commission either under contract or 
quasi-contract theories. Manifestly, the causes of action 
are not the same. Fitzgerald's third-party complaint rested 
upon the circular language of the Stock Purchase Agreement 
(R. 189). The Stock Purchase Agreement was between Fitz-
gerald and Monte Vista's former shareholders (R. 182-195). 
Plaintiff was not a party to that agreement (Id.). Plain-
tiff did not even learn about the Stock Purchase Agreement 
until after it had been executed. (R. 197-198.) 
Plaintiff's claims, which must be accepted as true 
at this stage of the litigation, arose out of an oral agree-
ment which plaintiff had with Monte Vista's president and 
out of principles of unjust enrichment. (R. 1-4.) As a 
result, Fitzgerald's third-party complaint in the prior 
action and plaintiff's present claims involve different 
rights of different parties arising at different times and 
involving different individuals. It cannot possibly be 
maintained that the cause of action in Fitzgerald's third-
party complaint and plaintiff's present claims are the same. 
Under such circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata does 
not apply. Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
1 C 
B. Neither was Plaintiff in Privity with 
Fitzgerald. 
The claim between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's 
former shareholders was personal Fitzgerald. (R. 182-195.) 
Plaintiff had no property right in that claim or any kind of 
an ownership interest in it. Plaintiff's claims against 
Fitzgerald were in no way dependent upon Fitzgerald's claim 
against Monte Vista's former shareholders as the fact that 
plaintiff's claim against Fitzgerald was allowed to proceed 
while the indemnification claim had been dismissed 
illustrates. 
A person in privity with another is "a person so 
identified in interest with one another that he represents 
the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d, 
689, 692 (Utah 1978). Privity is not established simply 
because various actions involve the consideration of the 
same or similar facts. Owens v. Kuro, 354 P.2d 696 (Wash. 
1960); Sodak Distributing Co. v. Wayne, 93 N.W.2d 791 (S.D. 
1958). For all practical purposes, privity requires that 
there be "mutual or successive rights in property." Searle 
Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d at 692. 
Plaintiff did not have any interest in Fitzgerald's 
third-party action and certainly has no interest in it now. 
Plaintiff's claim against Fitzgerald and plaintiff's present 
claims against the defendants to this action arise out of 
separate circumstances. 
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III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN 
MET. 
Two basic requirements of collateral estoppel are 
that the precise issue to be precluded in the second action 
must be exactly the same as one which was fully litigated in 
the first action. Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 
1983); Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978); 
Wilde v. Mid Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1981) . Although the underlying facts may be the same or 
similar, what is controlling is that "the issue that was 
actually litigated in the first suit was essential to the 
resolution of that suit and is the same factual issue as 
that raised in the second suit." Robertson v. Campbell, 674 
P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). Collateral estoppel also re-
quires that there be a final judgment on the merits against 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted or 
against someone in privity with such a party. Searle Bros, 
v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
The facts and circumstances which were mentioned 
in connection with the argument on res judicata are of equal 
applicability to collateral estoppel. The only claims which 
were litigated against Monte Vista's former shareholders in 
the prior action were litigated by Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald's 
claims involved different factual circumstances and arose 
out of different actions. There is no evidence in the 
record in this case which demonstrates that the critical 
issue of whether plaintiff's decision to attempt to collect 
from Fitzgerald meant that it also released Monte Vista and 
its former shareholders was actually litigated or that a 
final decision was reached on that issue. 
It is, of course, an elementary rule of law that 
an obligee cannot be deprived of recourse against the 
obligor by a substitution of debtors without the obligee's 
consent to release the original obligor from responsibility. 
Gambles v. Purdue, 572 P.2d 1241 (Mont. 1977); Dahl v. 
Brunswick Corp., 356 A.2d 221 (Maryland 1976); Tidewater Oil 
Co. v. Murphy Motors, Inc., 227 A.2d 443 (Conn. Ap. Div. 
1967); J. Shlainsey, Inc. v. Aitken, 21 A.2d 764 (N.J. 
1941); 6, Corbin on Contracts, §1297. Similarly, "a credi-
tor's mere acceptance of the obligation of a third person 
without an agreement or intention to release the original 
debtor or extinguish the original debt does not amount to a 
novation" which discharges the original obligor. Taylor v. 
Poulson, 552 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Utah 1976). 
An obligee can accept the obligation of a third 
party to pay the original debtor's debt either as additional 
security or as a release of the original obligor's 
responsibilities. Taylor, supra, at 1275; First National 
Bank in Evanston v. Sims, 301 P.2d 1103 (Id. 1956); 
Davenport v. Dickson, 507 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1973); 6, Corbin on 
Contracts, §1297. The original obligor has to prove not 
only that the obligee accepted a third party's performance 
or agreement to perform but also that he accepted such per-
formance or agreement to perform as a release of recourse 
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against the original obligee, "A creditor's assent to hold 
a new debtor liable is ineffective to constitute a novation 
unless there is assent to give up the original debtor." 
Davenport v. Dickson, 507 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1973). 
The burden of proof as to a novation which will 
release the original obligor rests upon the party who 
asserts it. Taylor, supra.; Davenport v. Dickson, supra. 
An intention to effect a novation which will release the 
original obligee is never presumed, and must be proved. 
(Id.) The mere fact that a creditor consents to a third 
party performing and even accepts payments from the third 
party does not create a presumption that the original debtor 
is released. Davenport v. Dickson, supra.; Jewell Co. of 
America v. George, 373 A.2d 1200 (R.I. 1977). In fact, it 
will be presumed that the new obligation will be accepted 
merely as additional or collateral security, or conditional-
ly, subject to full performance. Taylor v. Poulson, supra. 
In order to sustain a defense of novation, a de-
fendant must prove that the plaintiff in accepting the third 
party's promise to discharge the obligation "unequivocally 
agreed to release and discharged defendant from liability." 
Jewell Co. of America, Inc. v. George, 373 A.2d 1260, 1262 
(R.I. 1977) . The determination of whether a novation has 
occurred which has discharged the original obligor is a 
question of fact. Davenport v. Dickson, supra.; Dahl v. 
Brunswick Corp, 356 A.2d 221 (Maryland 1976); Tidewater Oil 
Co. v. Murphy Motors, Inc., 227 A.2d 443 (Conn. Cir. 1966). 
Additionally, a novation is an affirmative defense and must 
be specifically plead. New England Doll & Novelty Co. v. 
J. Del Dio, 187 A.2d 781 (R.I. 1963). 
There is no evidence that any of these issues were 
actually litigated in the prior action. There is no 
evidence that any of these issues were plead in the prior 
action. There is no evidence that any judgment on these 
issues was reached in the prior action. In fact, the issues 
surrounding the question of novation were never determined 
in the prior litigation because the defendants to this 
action were not defendants to any action by plaintiff in the 
prior action. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST FITZGERALD ALSO INVOLVED 
DIFFERENT ISSUES. 
The Trial Court1s ruling appears to be based upon 
its erroneous reading of the jury instruction quoted in the 
reported decision in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
626 P.2d 453 (1981) and does not appear to be based upon the 
adverse decision against plaintiff entered on plaintiff's 
claim against Fitzgerald. (R. 251-254.) If any part of the 
ruling were based upon such a decision, it would be in error 
because the Trial Court did not have the record o£ the prior 
case before it from which to make a judgment and because the 
issues which plaintiff litigated against Fitzgerald were 
different from those in the present case. 
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Plaintiff claims entitlement to recover from the 
defendants based upon an oral contract to pay a specific 
percentage. (R. 2.) At trial in the prior action, Fitz-
gerald insisted that he never agreed to pay a money commis-
sion and that the arrangement he had with plaintiff was for 
a joint purchase of the Ranch which fell through because 
plaintiff did not keep up his end of the bargain. (See 
Fitzgerald's Responding Brief, pages 1-3, filed in Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) 
No. 16746 attached in relevant part as Exhibit "C" hereto.) 
The Trial Court's observation that "Fitzgerald and plaintiff 
were still negotiating as to their possible joint purchase 
of the assets of Monte Vista" (R. 253) is an accurate state-
ment of Fitzgerald's defense of the prior action. Fitzgerald 
did not contend that plaintiff's commission had been paid, 
and his legal argument that plaintiff was owed no commission 
because of an alleged lack of a written instrument was not 
ruled upon by the Court (R. 153-155). All that the jury 
decided in the prior case was that under whatever 
arrangement plaintiff had with Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald was 
not obligated to pay the plaintiff any more. 
Plaintiff's arrangements and claims against the 
defendants in this action though related, arise as a result 
of different circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Fourth District Court's decision should be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
Because it did not have the record of the prior litigation 
before itf there was not sufficient evidence in the record 
to support the Court's decision. Moreover, the issues 
actually decided in the prior action were different from the 
issues present here. This fact alone precludes use of 
either res judicata or collateral estoppel. Additionally, 
when it is realized that the issues relevant to the present 
defendants were determined in connection with Fitzgerald's 
third-party complaint against Monte Vista's shareholders and 
not in the context of a complaint by plaintiff against them, 
there is also a lack of privity. 
DATED this J S^ day of O^itji*/ , 1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF (Appeal from the Summary 
Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, 
Honorable David Sam) (Trimble v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., et 
al.), was mailed this /S^day of flsJrdh^s , 1985, to 
the following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 683 
Provo, Utah 84603 
"ADDENDUM 
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RECEIPT 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Exhibit B 
STOCK SALE AGREEMENT 
(Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.) 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of ;h 
^ 1978, by and between WALLACE OiiKA day of 
NELSON, HOWARD D. SHERWOOD, JOYCE T. RICE and NELDOii w: 
(the "Sellers"), and LELAND A. FITZGERALD (the "Buyer"; 
K.a 
WITNESSETH: 
A. Sellers are the legal and equitable OWI;L-;V. and 
holders of all the issued and outstanding shares of the capital 
stock of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., a Utah corporation (the "Cor-
poration") . 
B. The Corporation is the equitable owner of the 
entire right, title and interest in and to certain real nrooert 
located in Utah County, State of Utah, the legal desc i' 1 r'. 'ion ..f 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Property"). 
C. Buyer desires to acquire from Sellers ar.o Sc-il.:' 
are willing to sell to Buyer, upon the terms and condii. i - -ao 
for the consideration herein reserved to be paid, kept -oiri per-
formed, all of the issued and outstanding shares of ? he ca.i-il 
stock of the Corporation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual prowls 
and covenants herein contained, and for other guou and .•-.•tiuabie 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which a:*e hereby 
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Sellers' Representations and W. jrraiiLi • 
Sellers hereby warrant and represent (but not jointr 
ally) as follows: 
(a) The Corporation i 
hereof, and, on the Closing 
defined in Section 5), will 
organized, validly existing 
under and by virtue of the 
Utah. The entire authorize 
Corporation consists, as of 
Agreement, of THREE HUNDRED 
shares of common stock havi 
per share, of which author! 
shares are and on the Closi 
and outstanding. Sellers, 
Agreement own and will also 
own the following number of 
s , as o L tile a a l e 
i Date (as hereina; 
. be , a corpora {. L-.M 
; and in good s l
 k.<. 
laws of zh^ Statv. 
:d capital stock • ; 
the ddte of t!i: .; 
i THOUSAND OuO,o«V 
.ng a par value ; :" 
.zed shares 29 J , :5J< 
.ng Date wi 11 he :. 
as of the date : 
1
 on the h Les iio. .<• 
snares: 
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>) 
SHAREHOLDER NUMBER OF SHAFvES 
Wallace Ohr.in 11(), {>(> / 
K.iy l\. Ni I .'.on I I (. .( . < > 
Howard D. Sherwood 1 2 , 1 . ' . ' 
Joyce T. Rice 20,000 
Neldon Williams 20,000 
As of the date hereof, there are not authorized or 
in existence, nor on the Closing Date will there 
be authorized or in existence, any subscription 
rights, options, warrants or other rights to the 
issuance, sale or purchase of additional shares of 
the capital stock of the Corporation. All issued 
and outstanding shares are fully paid and non-
assessable. 
(b) The Corporation is duly qualified and 
entitled to own, lease or otherwise deal with all 
of its properties and assets and to conduce its 
businesses in all of the jurisdictions where ,uch 
propcrrii"; ir<», n.<: o f fin* d n l c h « r i o f . nut »n ( In 
LluMllg U J L C , Wlii he, owned oi Leaded < i LIL'I 
businesses conducted. 
(c) Ab to the shares of the (!or;)oi\i i i«>n re-
ferred to in subsection (a) above, vacn Seller 
represents and warrants, but only with respect to 
his shares that he has full right, title ind 
interest in his respective shares as set forth in 
subsection (a), Lh.it .such shares ar< uhjci t to no 
options or similar nght of purchase nor to >n\ 
liens, encumbrances or sicuruy niuri:.! , oi nw 
type whatsoever nor has the Seller agreed to bub-
ject such shares to any security interest, and that 
it has the full, unconditional and unrestricted 
right, power and authority to enter into this 
Agreement and to sell and deliver all such shares 
in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. 
(d) Copies of the originals of the fallcwmg 
documents for the Corporation are attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B " Each such document is ^ aha, 
genuine and is, in all respects, what it purpurus 
to be: 
(i) The Articles or Certificate of 
Incorporation and all amendments thereto 
(certified within thirty (30) days prior t_-, 
this Agreement by Lhe appropriate jff.^Lal of 
the State of Utah), 
(ii) The bylaws, if any, of the Cor-
poration, as amended to date, and 
(iii) The complete minutes of tne 
Corporation. 
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(e) The balance sheet dated March 31, 1978, 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." The 
Corporation will, on the Closing Date, own the 
assets set forth on such balance sheet subject 
only to the liabilities set forth thereon. 
(f) Attached hereto marked Exhibit "D" is a 
schedule which fairly and correctly reflects all 
items of personal property and equipment owned or 
leased by the Corporation, subject only to the 
loan and lease obligations which are more particu-
larly identified and described on said Exhibit 
"D." The Schedule is a true and correct schedule 
of all significant personal properly .md equipment 
owned by the Corporation and all such property and 
assets are free and clear of any liens or encum-
brances not disclosed in such Schedule. Prior to 
the Closing, Buyer will have inspected such 
personal property and by such inspection will be 
deemed to have accepted such personal property 
in its existing condition. 
(g) The Corporation is, as of the date of 
this Agreement, and will be, as of the Closing 
Date, the sole equitable owner, under a real 
estate contract, and in possession of all of the 
legal and beneficial right, title and interest in 
and to the Property, including, without limita-
tion, all buildings, structures and other im-
provements situated thereon, all easements over 
adjoining real property or real properties, any 
and all appurtenances in any way appertaining 
thereto and che Sellers' entire rij/.ht, title and 
interest in and to any land lying in the bed uf 
any street, road or avenue (whether open, closed 
or proposed) adjoining the Property and the 
Sellers' entire right, title and interest in and 
to any award made or to be made in lieu thereof 
and in and to any unpaid award made or to be made 
in lieu thereof and in and to any unpaid award or 
damages to the Property by reason of the change to 
any street or a condemnation or taking for public 
use. A copy of the real estate contract: pursuant 
to which the Corporation is purchasing the Prop-
erty is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
(h) Reference is made to the real estate 
contract attached hereto as Exhibit "E." As 
of the Closing, the Corporation shall not be in 
default or breach of .md has performed ..I. >f it:, 
obligations .md dut ic:. under the- cnntr.ji t 
(i) No adverse or unpaid jud^ nienLs n out-
standing against the Sellers or the C(.rpoL\»ii < >n 
which could or would adversely affect the L^ -r:^  , 
conditions or warranties set forth in this Agree-
ment or the ability or capacity of the SeiLers to 
perform hereunder. 
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*• • Seller:; ' Agreement to Sell and Capital Stuck Lu 
be Sold. Sellers agree to sell ana\ on the Closing Date (as de-
fined in Section 4), will transfer and deliver to Buyer, free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims or outstanding interests 
whatsoever, certificates endorsed in blank or with appropriate 
stock powers, with signature guarantees, representing all of the 
issued and outstanding shares of the capital stock of the Corpor-
ation (the "Stock"). 
By acquisition of such Stock, Buyer shall acquire 
ownership of the entity owning the properties, assets, rights, 
privileges and interests related to the Corporation including, 
without limitation, the Property, plus any such items as have 
been acquired subsequent to this date and minus any such items as 
have been disposed of subsequent to this date (but only to the 
extent permitted by the terms of this Agreement or approved by 
Buyer). The items to be owned by the Corporation include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, all fixed or tangible assets, 
accounts receivable, equipment, furniture, fixtures, supplies, 
contracts, leases, licenses, consents, franchises, permits, 
prepaid expenses, books and records, names, trademarks, trade 
names insurance policies, choses in action, claims and any and 
all other properties, whether real or personal, tangible or 
intangible, except any items specifically excluded by the terms 
of this Agreement; provided that Buyer understands that the 
Corporation will have no cash or bank accounts on the Closing 
Date. 
Although the Sellers are selling stock rather than 
real property, they hereby agree to provide, at their cost and 
expense, a standard owner's form policy of title insurance in the 
sum of $1,400,000.00, showing title to the Property to be vested 
in the Corporation or its assignee; provided that such obligation 
shall not arise until the real estate contract referred to in 
Section 1(g) is discharged. 
3. Agreement to Purchase. 
(a) Buyer agrees to purchase, upon the terms 
and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, 
the Stock described in Section 2 and will pay for 
the same as hereinafter set forth. 
(b) The aggregate purchase price to be oaid 
by Buyer for the Stock shall be $1,400,802.95 (the 
"Purchase Price") and shall be paid as follows: 
(i) $400,000.00 shall be paid in cash 
at the Closing. 
(ii) interest only at the rate of ei^ht 
percent (8%) per annum from the Closing Date 
to be paid on May 1, 1980. 
(iii) The balance together with interest 
computed on the unpaid balance outstanding 
from time to time computed at the rate of 
eight percent (8%) per annum shall be due and 
payable in ten (10) equal annual installments 
of principal and interest commencing on the 
third (3rd) anniversary of the Closing and on 
each anniversary thereafter. 
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At the election of Sellers, each Seller may re-
ceive a separated promissory note for his pro-
rata portion of the deferred Purchase Price. 
(c) Buyer shall execute and deliver to 
Sellers promissory notes (the "Notes") in the 
principal amount of the balance of the Purchase 
Price described in subsection lb) (in. The Note; 
shall be in the form all ached heieln a:. KxbibM 
"F." The Notes shall permit unlimited prepayment 
of interest and/or principal without penalty after 
January 2, 1979. 
(d) As security for payment, the Buyer will 
execute and deliver a pledge agreement (the "Pledge 
Agreement") in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
"G" and a deed of trust (the "Deed of Trust") in 
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "H." 
4. The Closing and the Closing Date. The consumma-
tion of the purchase of the Stock shall constitute the "Closing" 
and the date upon which such consummation takes place shall be 
the "Closing Date," as such terms are respectively used in this 
Agreement. The Closing Date shall be no earlier than April 15, 
1978, nor any later than May 31, 1978, on such regular business day, 
at such time during regular business hours and at such place 
within Utah County, State of Utah as is specified in written 
notice by Buyer to Sellers given at least ten (10) days prior to 
the date set for Closing. If Buyer fails to give notice to 
Sellers of the date, time and place of Closing by the date which 
is ten (10) days prior to the final Closing Date as permitted 
hereunder, or as the same may be extended by mutual agreement of 
the parties, then Sellers may fix the date, time and place of 
Closing by written notice to Buyer in the manner herein provided 
and, in the absence of written notice by either party to the 
other, the Closing shall occur on the final date permitted there-
for by the terms of this Agreement in the offices of Howard D. 
Sherwood, 562 West State Street, American Fork, Utah, commencing 
at 10:00 a.m. 
5. Documents, Certificates, Opinions, Etc., to be 
Delivered at the Closing. 
(a) At the Closing, Sellers shall deliver to 
Buyer the following: 
(i) Certificates endorsed in blank or 
with appropriate stock powers, with signature 
guarantees by a national bank and with rev-
enue stamps affixed, if required, represent-
ing all of the issued and outstanding shares 
of capital stock of the Corporation. 
(ii) The corporate minutes books, 
Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, stock 
transfer books, corporate seals, books of 
accounts and other financial records, tax 
returns, and all franchises, deeds, bills of 
sale, insurance policies, contracts, mort-
gages, leases and all other documents per-
taining to any property owned or used by the 
Corporation. 
(iii) A written resignation of each of 
the officers and directors of the Corpora-
tion. 
(b) At the Closing, Buyer shall deliver to 
Sellers the following: 
(i) The payment required by Section 
3(b)(i) hereof. 
(ii) The Notes required by Section 3(c) 
hereof. 
(iii) The Pledge Agreement and Deed of 
Trust required by Section 3(d) hereof. 
6* Conditions Precedent to Buyer's Obligation to 
Consummate This Transaction. The obligations or Buyer to close 
hereunder are, at the option of Buyer, subject to compliance by 
Sellers with, at or prior Lo the Closing Date, L-.U h uf tin- fol-
lowing conditions precedent 
(j) Si'l U'l:. -.U.ill h.lVe leiuleied .ill ft llu 
certificates evidencing the shares being sold 
hereunder, together with the endorsements .uul 
guarantees as provided for in Section j, and 
(b) Sellers shall have performed and com-
plied with all conditions required by this Agree-
ment to be performed or complied with by Sellers 
prior to or at the Closing. 
7. Investigation by Buyer. During the period from 
the date of this Agreement to the Closing Date, Sellers shall 
cause Buyer to be given free access to the offices, records, 
files, stock books, minute books, books of account and copies of 
tax returns of the Corporation, insofar as the same relate to 
assets being acquired hereunder, for the purpose of conducting an 
investigation of all matters relating to the business, properties 
and assets of the Corporation. If this Agreement is not con-
summated as provided herein, Buyer and its representatives shall 
treat all information obtained hereunder, not otherwise known to 
Buyer or already in the public domain, as confidential and shall 
upon request return to Sellers copies made by Buyer and its 
representatives of material belonging to the Corporation. 
8. Conduct of Business Pending Closing. During the 
period from the date hereof to and including the Closing Date, 
Sellers shall cause the Corporation to conduct its operations in 
the ordinary and usual course of business and to maintain its 
records and books of account in accordance with generally accept-
ed accounting principles consistently applied and in a manner 
which fairly and correctly reflects its income, expenses and 
liabilities. Sellers agree that during such period the Corpor-
ation shall not, without the written consent of Buyer: 
(a) Pay or incur any obligation or liabil-
ity, absolute or contingent, other than current 
liabilities incurred in the ordinary and usual 
course of business; 
(b) Incur any indebtedness for borrowed 
money (except for endorsement, for collection or 
for deposit, of negotiable instruments received in 
the ordinary and usual course of business), as-
sume, guarantee, endorse or otherwise as accommo-
dation become responsible for obligations of any 
other individual, firm or corporation, or make any 
loans or advances to any individual, firm or 
corporation; 
(c) Declare or pay any dividends or make any 
payment or distribution to stockholders as such, 
issue any capital stock or purchase or otherwise 
acquire for value any of its outstanding capital 
stock or grant options, warrants or rights to pur-
chase any shares of its capital stock; 
(d) Mortgage, pledge or subject to lien or 
other encumbrance any of its properties or assets; 
(e) Sell or transfer any of its properties 
or assets or canel, release or assign any indebt-
edness owed to it or any claims held by it; 
(f) Make any investment of a capital nature 
either by the purchase of stock or securities, 
contributions Lo cnpiml, property transfers or 
otherwise, or by the purchase of any property or 
assets of any other individual, firm or corpora-
tion; 
(g) Make any material change in its insur-
ance or enter into: 
(i) Any agency agreement; 
(ii) Any contract for the purchase or 
sale of any materials, products, services or 
supplies other than such contracts incurred 
in the ordinary and usual course of business; 
(iii) Any contract for the purchase or 
sale of any materials, products, services or 
supplies, the total contract price of which 
exceeds $500.00 or which contains an escala-
tor, renegociation or redetermination clause 
or which provides for a fixed term, 
(iv) Any management: or consultation 
agreement; 
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(v) Any lease, license, royalty or 
union agreement, or 
(vi) Any other agreement nor in tho 
ordinary and usual course of business, 
(h) Pay or contract to pay, in any manner 
compensation to any of its officers or employees, 
or pay or agree to pay any pension or retirement 
allowance to any such officers or employees, or 
commit itself to any pension, retirement or orofit 
sharing plan or agreement or employment agreement 
with or for the benefit of any officer, enplovee 
or other person or 
(, 1 ) I iki m y K I i o n w h i i h vv«»n I d i i I • < i « 
with or prevent perlormance oi this ^leemert 
9. Indemnification by Sellers The Sellers snail 
indemnify the Buyer, defend and hold it harmless, witn resr>ect to 
all liabilities of the Corporation known to Sellers, whether 
accrued, absolute, contingent or otherwise exi >tinr it rh^ rusin,' 
D * f < I D I h c I ' H l r n l n o I ell t I «> i <1 1 hi I d i i , I H I I Hi l u l l li I I I I I I I H , 
I h e I i ib i I I ( y o I < ,u h :>< I ! < i h i I 1 lu I i MI i I < d I <» m mi m i l < i ! i \\ 
l.iLed by multiplying the total liability b/ the nuiiihti v\ OIKILLS 
owned by such Seller and dividing the product by 295, b5o 
10. Possession, lUbk of Loss. The Buyer sh.ill enter 
into possession of the Stock and Property and the other assets 
purchased hereunder as of the Closing Date, at which time bene-
fits and burdens of ownership shall be transferred to the Huver 
A l l n 1< o f 1 (>'. . p n o i ( o ( h i (* 1 (> i 11 y i) i ( < 11 i 1 1 I »< u p . n f l u 
Seller> 
11. Real Estate Commissions Each party represents 
and warrants that it has incurred no obligation lor real estate 
or other brokerage commissions in connection with tne transaction 
contemplated hereby and each party agrees to lndemm^' and ncld 
the other party harmless from and against any sach liability 
arising from the former party's conduct or activities 
12. Execution of Documents. Both parties hereto agree 
to execute, acknowledge and deliver to the other partv such 
agreements of sale, deeds, assignments and other instruments as 
may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to carry out tne terms 
and intent of this Agreement. 
13. General Conditions; Miscellaneous Provisions. 
13.1 Notice. As used in this Agreement, notice 
includes but is not limited to the communication of notice, 
request, approval, statement, report, acceptance, consent, waiver 
and appointment. No notice of the exercise of any option or 
election is required unless the provision giving the election or 
option expressly requires notice. All notices must be in writ-
ing; provided that no writing other than the check or other 
instrument representing a payment itself need accompany a payment. 
Except when actual receipt is expressly required by the terms 
hereof, notice is considered given either (a) when delivered in 
person to the recipient named as below, or (b) three (3) days 
after deposit in the United States mail in a sealed envelope or 
container, either registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, postage and postal charges prepaid, addressed by name 
and address to the party or person intended as follows: 
TO SELLERS: c/o Howard D. Sherwood 
562 West State Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
TO BUYER: Leland A. Fitzgerald 
Either party may, by notice given at any time or from time to 
time, require subsequent notices to be given to another indi-
vidual person, whether a party or an officer or representative, 
or to a difference address, or both. Notices i-iu'ii before actual 
receipt of notice of change shall not be invalidated ,>/ the 
change. Such recipient named muat be an individual pit (»n. If 
more than one recipient is named, delivery of notice to any one 
such recipient is sufficient. If none of"the recipients named in 
the latest designation of recipient is available fur delivery in 
person, and if the notice addressed by mail to each recipient 
named in the latest designation of recipient is returned to the 
sender undelivered, notice shall be sufficient if sent by mail as 
above to the party as named in this Agreement, unless the naine or 
identity of the party has changed as permitted in thi^ lease and 
proper notice of the change has been given, in which event the 
notice shall be sufficient if sent by mail as above to the party 
named in the latest notice designating the party, and the notice 
is considered given when the first attempt to give notice was 
properly made. 
13.2 Titles and Captions. The cable of con-
tents, if any, and all Part or Section titles or captions to this 
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not b« deemed part 
of this Agreement and in no way define, limit, augr.ent, extend or 
describe the scope, content or intent of any part or oarts of 
this Agreement. 
13.3 Pronouns and Plurals. Whenever cne context 
may require, any pronoun used herein shall include the corres-
ponding masculine, feminine or neuter forms and chtt ^insular form 
of nounts, pronouns and verbs shall include the plural and vice 
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versa. Each of the foregoing geners and plurals is understood to 
refer to a corporation, partnership or other legal entity when 
the context so requires. 
13.4 Further Action. The parties shall execute 
and deliver all documents, provide all information and take or 
forebear from all such action as may be necessary or appropriate 
to achieve the purposes of this Agreement. 
13.5 Applicable Law. This Agreement shall be 
construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of the 
State of Utah, except its choice of law rules. 
13.6 Binding Effect Upon Successors. This 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
parties and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, legal representatives and assigns; provided that this 
provision shall not be construed as permitting assignment, sub-
stitution, delegation or other transfer of rights or obligations 
except strictly in accordance with the provisions >,\ i.he other 
Herf ions of lM«-: Af rfcinctii 
1 3 . 7 I n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s A r m " t e n ; < . O I , M i ! u l e > 
t h e e n t i r e a j ' . r e e u i e n I a i m m ^ I In- ;>a i I i e: . p e i ( a i n i n.- i . > ( In • w\ > j ei ( 
ma l I e l h e t ' e o l , a i u l M I J M - I M M I C .I ! I JH i e i ,\f\\ c e n i e l l ! •• i i n i ui!<!< i 
standings pertaining thereto. No covenant, represtniai I^u or 
condition not expressed in this Agreement shalL affect or be 
deemed to interpret, change or restrict the express provisions 
hereof. The failure of either party to inspect the documents 
referred to herein constitutes a waiver of anv objection, con-
tention or claim that may be based upon such an inspection. 
13.8 Waiver. No failure by any partv cc insist 
upon the strict performance of any covenant, ciutv, agreement or 
condition of this Agreement or to exercise any right or remeuy 
consequent upon a breach thereof shall constitute a waiver of any 
such breach or of such or any other covenant, agreement , term or 
condition. Any party may, by notice delivered in the manner 
provided in this Agreement, but shall be under no obligation to, 
waive any of his rights or any conditions to his obli"ations 
hereunder, or any duty, obligation or covenant of any otner 
party. No waiver shall affect or alter the remainder of this 
Agreement but each and every other covenant, agreement, term and 
condition hereof shall continue in full force and effect with 
respect to any other then existing or subsequently occurring 
breach. 
13.9 Rights and Remedies . The rigr.ts and reme-
dies of any of the parties hereto shall not be mutually exclus-
ive, and the exercise of one or more of the provisions CL this 
Agreement shall not preclude the exercise of any other orcvi-
sions. Each of the parties confirms that damages at lav, may be 
an inadequate remedy for a breach or threatened breach of an;/ 
provisions hereof. The respective rights and obligations here-
under shall be enforceable by specific performance, mjanction or 
other equitable remedy, but nothing herein contained is intended 
to or shall limit or affect any rights at law or by statute ar 
otherwise of any party aggrieved as against the ctr.er rirties for 
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a breach or threatened breach of any provision hereof, it beinp, 
the intention by this Section to make clear the agreement of the 
parties that the respective rights and obligations of the parties 
hereunder shall be enforceable in equity as well as at law or 
otherwise. 
13.10 Severability. In the event that any condi-
tion, covenant or other provisions herein contained is held m b<-
invalid or void by any court of competent jurisdiction, the '-.nine 
shall be deemed severable from the remainder of this Agreement 
and shall in no way affect any other covenant or condition herein 
contained. If such condition, covenant or other provision shall. 
be deemed invalid due to its scope or breadth, such provision 
shall be deemed valid to the extent of the scope or breadth 
permitted by law. 
13.11 Attorneys f Fees. In the event either party 
hereto fails to carry out its obligation hereunder, the party in 
default shall pay all costs and expenses, including attorneys' 
fees (including any incurred in connection with any appeal), in-
curred by the other party in enforcing its rights or in obtaining 
redress for the breach. 
13.12 Exhibits. All Exhibits annexed to this 
Agreement and the documents to be delivered at or prior to the 
Closing are expressly made a part of this Agreement as fully as 
though completely set forth in it. All references to this Agree-
ment, either in the Agreement itself or in any of such writings, 
shall deem to refer to and include this Agreement and all such 
Exhibit'-, a n d w r i t inp.^ A n v b r o a c h o f n r d o ("null m u h r m y p r n -
v i :. i ») 11:. t > I a n y <»I M i c h w i i I i 11}\ • •. h. i I I , 1 »»i .ill | • i n j • < • « • . » < a i • I i 
t u t e a b r e a c h o r del.nil t u n d e r t h i .*; A)'.i ci'innii a n d ill < a h n a i r h 
writings. 
13.13 Authorization. Each individual executing 
this Agreement does thereby represent and warrant to each other 
person so signing (and each other entity for which another person 
may be signing) that he has been duly authorized to deliver this 
Agreement in the capacity and for the entity set forth where he 
signs. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement on the date first set forth above. 
SELLERS: 
WALLACE OHRAN 
7 r <- / 
RAY E.'NELSON 
-II-
HOWARD D. SHERwOOU. 
JQYCE"/?r. RICE 
NhLDON WIILI\MS 
BUYER: 
.7 
LELAND A. t-'if/.Gj-.KAL!) (L-'k't^fi^f 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PARCEL 1: Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 7, 
Township 6 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence 
North 21.50 chains; thence West 40 chains; thence North 
841.5 feet; thence East 40 chains; thence North 25.75 chains, 
thence West 80 chains; thence South 60 chains; thence East 
80 chains to beginning. 
PARCEL 2: Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 8, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 3: Northwest quarter; West half of the Southwest 
quarter; Lots 2,3,6,7,8,9 of Section 17, Township 6 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 4: All of Section 18, Township 6 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 5: Lots 4,9,10,11, Northwest quarter of Southwest 
quarter of Section 20, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, also Lots 2 and 3; Northwest quarter of 
Northwest quarter of Section 20. 
PARCEL 6: North 1/2 and the Southwest 1/4 of Section 15, 
Township 6 South, Range 2 We si , S.ill Lake Meruli.m 
PARCEL 7: The South half of Section 24, Township 6 South, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 8: Lots 2,3,4 and the East half of Southwest quarter, 
Southeast quarter of Southwest quarter and Southwest quarter 
of Northeast quarter of Section 28, Township 6 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 9: Lots 3,4 and 8, Section 29, Township 6 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 10: Southeast quarter; East half of Southwest quarter; 
Southeast quarter of Northwest quarter and Southwest quarter 
of Northeast quarter of Section 30, Township 6 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. Also Northeast quarter of 
Northeast quarter of said Section 30. 
PARCEL 11: West 3/4 of Section 25, Township 6 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 14: Northeast quarter of Section 35, Townsnip 6 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
PARCEL 15: All of Section 36, Township 6 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Exhibit C 
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SrArEMLMT OF THE NATL'RL OF THE CASt. 
P l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t broughc t h i s s u i t to co l l ecp 
a r e a l e s t a t e commission in money from the buyer . 
DISPOSITION IK THE LOwtR COURT OF THE CASc 
Af te r a four day t r i a l , the ju ry found tor defendant 
and the c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment of "no cau^e of a c t i o n " 
on t h a t v e r d i c t in favor of defendant F i t z g e r a l d . 
Rri IE.F SOUGHT C£ APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff i rmance of the v e r d i c t and judg-
ment e n t e r e d the reon . 
STATEMLNT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a tement of f - c t s 
except in the fol lowing p a r t i c u l a r s : The s e l l e r of the ranch 
in the Earnes t Money Agreement was not U i l l ace Ohran, but 
Monte Vi*1 1 Ranch, I n c . , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , of shich Ohran 
was a m i n o r i t y (390/3) s tockho lde r and i t s p r e s i d e n t . Ohran 
did not have, the a u t h o r i t y to g ive and did not give p l a i n t i f f 
an o r a l or w r i t t e n l i s t i n g . (R. 616, 523, 40, 45) Ohran simply 
l e t F l o r e n c e , l i k e many o t h e r r e a l e s t a t e men, b r ing him o f f e r s . 
I f he l i k e d one, h e ' d submit i t to the o the r s t o c k h o l d e r s . 
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There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether the purchase 
pr ice was lowered from 2 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s to $1 ,875,000 upon tl 
promise of defendant F i tzgera ld to pay a commission to p l a i n t 
Florence claimed t h i s , but F i t zgera ld denied i t . The f a i r im 
port of the testimony of Ohran and Sherwood (Monte V i s t a ' s se 
retary) was that they l e f t p l a i n t i f f and defendant alone to 
work out Florence 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the purchase of the ram 
They were r e a l l y never concerned about i t . See Point I (c) 
more d e t a i l s on t h i s quest ion. 
Florence sought in h i s Second Amended Complaint a commi 
ion payable in money in the sum of $125,000. (He did not se 
any a l t e r n a t i v e r e l i e f ) P l a i n t i f f referred to h i s claim thr 
out the t r i a l as a 6"'3 commission which would only be $120,0C 
something he never explained. Defendant denied ever promis: 
to pay him a commission in money but did agree to allow him 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the purchase of part of the i r r i g a t e d land w 
had the farm house on i t , together witn one-half of the mac 
inery. (This i s s imi lar to Florence 1 s or ig ina l claim in hi 
f i r s t complaint) However, Florence could never come up wit 
funds to p a r t i c i p a t e in the purchase. (R. 743,63) He i n t o 
to s e l l the land, or part of i t , to some Cal i fornia i n t e r e 
and r e a l i z e a p r o f i t . 
Defendant a lso wants to point out that the Earnest Mc 
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Agreement upon which plaintiff bases his claim for a com 
sion was mutually terminated by the seller and buyer. M 
later, a stock sales agreement with different parties, t 
and subject matter was drawn and performed. Defendant d 
agrees that this change in agreement did not affect Flor 
right to compensation. See Point IV of the argument of 
brief. 
POINT IV. 
ASSUMING THKRt WAS hRROR IN THE TRIAL 3ELOW, THE VERDICT 
CAN BE SUSTAINED BtCAUSb THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS EXTIN-
GUISHLU WHEN THE SELLER AND BUYER MUTUALLY TERMINATED 
THE EARNEST MONbY AGRhtMENT. 
In the Dec. 7th Earnest Money (Exh. 1-P) the seller 
was Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. and the buyer was Leland Fitz-
gerald. It was a contract to buy and sell land. That con-
tract was never perforraed but was mutually terminated by th 
parties thereto. Subsequently, a completely different azre 
ment was entered into but between different parties and on 
different subject matter. Many new terms were added. This 
new agreement was Exh. 3-P entitled, Stock Sale Agreement. 
The five stockholders were the sellers. The buyer remaine< 
the same. The subject matter was not land,-but stock of M< 
Vista Corp. Other differences are that the down payment w 
reduced from $500,000 to 5400,000; one half of the mineral 
rights were reserved by sellers (exh, 10-D). Fitzgerald ha 
assume the debts of the corporation and the purchase price 
accordingly reduced. No provision was made for the paymen 
any commission. Instead, Paragraph 11 was inserted provid 
f,Each party represents and warrants that it has in-
curred no obligation for real estate or other Drokerc 
commissions in connection with the transaction conten 
plated hereby and each party agrees to indemnify and 
hold the other party harmless from and against any si 
liability arising from the former party's conduct or 
activities.,f 
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Because of the foregoing provision, Fitzgerald when 
sued by Florence for a conimission brought the stockholder 
into the action as third party defendants. The trial COL 
dismissed them out before the case went to the jury. 
The point to be made here is that because the Earner 
Money Agreement was mutually terminated by seller and buj 
no rights in favor of plaintiff can arise from that dead 
strument. The parties had every right to mutually termir 
it. When that happened the rights of any third party ber 
iaries were also terminated. The rule is well stated in 
statement of Contracts, Sec. 143, as follows: 
f,A discharge of the promisor by the promisee in a 
contract or a variation thereof by them is effective 
against a creditor beneficiary if: 
fa) the creditor beneficiary does not bring suit 
upon the promise or otherwise materially change his 
position in reliance thereon before he knows of the 
discharge or variation, and-
(b) the promisee's action is not a fraud on cred. 
tors/1 
Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, Sec. 815,approves the 
statement rule and states it is "not out of harmony with 
existing decisions". (footnote, pg. 259) 
The plaintiff learned of the termination of the Ear 
Money near Jan. 15, 1973. (R. 619, 621, 764) He did not 
bring suit until months later, Aug. 7, 1978. He present 
evidence that he had changed his position in reliance up 
alleged promise of Fit.2gerald to pay him a consnissiun. 
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s t i l l had a l l the r i g h t s he ever had a g a i n s t Monte V i s t a 
and Ohran. Under the foregoing s t a t emen t of the l av from 
the Restatement, F lo r ence cannot l e g a l l y complain t h a t the 
Ea rnes t Money agreement was t e rmina ted and h i s r i g h t to a 
commission based thereon was l i k e w i s e t e rmina ted , lie had 
not b rought s u i t ; he had not changed h i s p o s i t i o n m a t e r i a l l y 
in r e l i a n c e the reon ; i t was not a f raud on c r e d i t o r s s ince 
i t was done for tax r e a s o n s . The t r i a l cou r t should have 
g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion for a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t made on 
t h i s ground (R.693) or a t l e a s t submi t ted the ques t ion to the 
j u r y to a s c e r t a i n the p e r t i n e n t f a c t s r e l a t i n g to t h a t defense 
See Defendan t ' s Requested I n s t r . Mo. 1 (R. 202) 
CONCLUSION 
This case was t r i e d before a j u r y a t the r e q u e s t of the 
p l a i n t i f f . The j u r y l i s t e n e d to the evidence and arguments 
for four days and then r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t in favor of the 
defendant . The j u r y was p r o p e r l y raid adequa te ly i n s t r u c t e d 
on p l a i n t i f f ' s theory of the ca se , ( i n s t , Mo. 3) Counsel for 
p l a i n t i f f in h i s c l o s i n g argument to the j u r y f u l l y ar-;ued th 
t h i r d par ty , b e n e f i c i a r y theory . R. 36b,67, They f.:ere not ...is 
l ed in any manner. They j u s t did not buy p l a i n t i f f ' s theory 
b u t i n s t e a d a p p a r e n t l y chose to b e l i e v e F i t z g e r a l d ' s t e s t i -
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RICHARD C. HOWE
 nv< jf ^ f l l J ^ L x 
Attorney for Defendant •"*] ' f[,7f 
and Third Party Plaintiff 
5055 South State St. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 262-2939 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE 
and CAL FLORENCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
LELAND A. FITZGERALD 
Defendant and NO. Q 78-4944 
T h i r d p a r t y P l a i n t i f f 
v s . 
WALLACE OHRAN, RAY E. NELSON, 
HOWARD D. SHERWOOD, JOYCE T. RICE, 
and NELDON WILLIAMS, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Third party plaintiff complains against third party 
defendants as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs, MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE and CAL 
FLORENCE, have filed against the defendant a Second Amended 
Complaint, a copy of which is hereto attached as exhibit A. 
2. The third party defendants, as sellers, and the 
third party plaintiff, LELAND A. FITZGERALD, as buyer, entered 
into a Stock Sale Agreement wherein the sellers sold to the 
buyer all of the stock of Monte Vista Ranch Inc. a Uc.ah Cor-
poration and as a part of that written agreement agreed in 
paragraph 11 that they had incurred no obligation for any 
real estate or other brokerage commissions in connection with 
the sale and agreed to indemnify and hold the buyer harmless 
from and against any such liability arising from sellers conduct 
- 2 -
3 . In t h e i r S e c o n d Amended C o m p l a i n t p l a i n t i f f s 
a l l e g e t h a t t h i r d p a r t v d e f e n d a n t <* or * me of t^ern 
o r a J 1 v a g r e e d t o J«IV p ' - a i i - t i f f • * v . • 
ef * e i i J . aniouni l i on , 
n d e r che te rn io j f t h e S t o c k sale a g r e e m e n t 
t h i r d \.<ir* - d e f e n d a n t s . t r ? l i a b l e ' r i e f e n d a n r '' >r 
-my ^ r ' P ' - r* --MTUM > , * * -
ie 1 enu U-K I s -n t i t l e d 
\7HEREF0KE, d e f e n d a n t ,nr **i> -i p ~ r " p ' s i r i : : 
t n j : :ie bo a w a r d e d - : '- .
 ; . : i 
[ J ' • a m o u n t s . i-s a j u a g e d > - ^ M 
p ; d i n t i f f ^ j_n t i n s a c t i o n } fo; - costfc m c u r r e : D\ ~,L"i 
i n d e f e n d i n g t h i s a c t i o n ; i n c l u d i n g a r e a . o n a b l e 
f e e and cce L- "f - ' ' - i 
seem • • C U I U L . 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
and T h i r d P a r t y P l a i n t i f f 
M a i l e d a -vvr- vf "h. i .v. e-.>- ' "H--:r ~.; ;7\ Tr ..'• 1 
- '- • -^ j -ley f-K" p . u n t i l r . 2040 E a s t 
*rUU S o u t h , S u i c e J f H , S a l t Lake C: y , 7 t a n 8 4 1 1 7 , t h i s 
5<^~ day of J^^^^—
 9 1 9 7 9 # 
Mel Trimble Real Estate and 
STATE OF UTAH Cal Florence 
ss. C-78-4944 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE V ' 
Leland A. Fitzgerald vs. 
Wallace Ohran, et< 
I, H. DIXON HINDLEY, Qerk in and for the County of Salt Lake and Ex-Officio 
Qerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original 
•Third Party Complaint 
•Minute Entry from Sept. 17th, 1979-
as appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set ray hand 
and affixed my official seal, this l u t n ; 
October An IQ 85 
, AD. 19 
Qerk 
^ Z « : Deputy Clerk 
